Conspiracy belief, conspiracy mentality and democratic culture in Europe. A comparative study

Over the past decade, a growing number of (mostly psychological) studies have examined the individual correlates and antecedents of conspiracy belief in Western societies (Bordeleau 2023; Stasielowicz 2022). However, when it comes to examining its implications for a democracy from a political science perspective, the existing literature is still limited (Castanho Silva et al. 2017; Sutton & Douglas, 2020; Vegetti & Littvay, 2021). While some studies focus on historical, philosophical and ethnographic perspectives (Davis 2024; Ekman 2022; Hernández Aguilar 2023), the empirical investigation of conspiracy narratives and their consequences for democracies faces some serious challenges. Due to a lack of appropriate measures and empirical data, many questions about the ideological framework and political consequences of conspiracy belief still remain unanswered. Comparative studies that draw broader conclusions beyond the specific context of particular countries and issues are rare – with only a few exceptions (Drochon, 2019; Herold, 2024; Walter & Drochon, 2022). This is particularly true for Europe, as much of the existing literature focuses on the United States. Moreover, the notion of a conspiracy mentality - which may precede an individual's tendency to believe in specific issue- or event-related conspiracy myths - has received little attention from political scientists yet (Nera 2024; Imhoff 2024). The relationship between these different dimensions of conspiracy thinking is also rather unclear (Sutton et al 2024). Our paper addresses this gap. Based on the first wave of a newly established panel survey conducted in eight EU Member States (Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Spain and Sweden; n = 34,000) in February 2025, we analyse the prevalence of both a general conspiracy mentality and the specific belief in political conspiracy narratives in Europe as well as their respective relationship with attitudes towards democracy. To assess this, we use the ‘Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire’ (CMQ) by Bruder et al. (2013) and five different conspiracy narratives on topics such as the ‘Great Replacement Myth’, the ‘Climate Hoax’ and the terrorist attack in Israel on 7 October 2023. Using statistical modelling, we examine the deeper roots and contexts of political conspiracy thinking in three steps: First, we trace the spread of specific conspiracy narratives and mentalities across Europe, highlighting differences between countries and specific social groups. Second, we shed light on the relationship between conspiracy mentality and the belief in specific conspiracy narratives by systematically investigating their mutual predictive power. Third, we show how both dimensions of conspiracy thinking are related to attitudes towards democracy - such as political satisfaction and trust, populist attitudes, democratic resilience, and sympathy for radical parties. Our study thus contributes to a better understanding of the spread of conspiracy thinking in Europe. It offers a comparative perspective on its possible consequences for the democratic culture in different regions and national contexts. It also provides a nuanced view of the relationship between a general conspiracy mentality and the specific belief in concrete conspiracy myths, which can be further explored in the future due to the intended panel structure of our data.