Navigating State Agency: U.S. Funding and the Externalisation of Migration Control in Panama

This paper examines the role of transit and sending countries in the processes of externalised border enforcement controls. Previous literature has extensively focused on the role of receiving countries in the Global North and their shifting responsibilities for border control to third countries. However, there is limited research regarding the ways in which border externalisation influences the political mechanisms underpinning bilateral agreements, as well as how transit and sending countries exercise their own agency within this process. This study addresses this gap by analysing the emerging practice of U.S. financing of border enforcement operations in Panama. The country is strategically positioned to curb migration flows originating from South America and the Caribbean and has become an important state actor in migration governance within the region. To this end, I conduct a document and policy analysis while also examining the narratives and discourses surrounding externalised border controls, employing a theoretical framework derived from previous studies on securitisation and territoriality. The paper posits that bilateral agreements, often framed as diplomatic arrangements, can significantly shape the already complex and intertwined structures of migration and border governance in the Global South.