From Corruption to Stockholm Syndrome: Examining State Capture Through Public-Private Interactions in Strategic Sectors

The paper examines the phenomenon of state capture in advanced democracies, using the port of Genoa—a critical economic hub in Italy—as a case study. By leveraging judicial inquiries and media analysis, it explores the dynamic interplay between public and private actors, shedding light on the governance mechanisms and relational dynamics that underlie this form of corruption. The study conceptualizes state capture not as a static condition but as a dynamic process, shaped by evolving power configurations and changes in political and regulatory contexts. Building on David-Barrett’s (2023) definition of state capture, the paper adopts a relational perspective, emphasizing the interactions and evolving relationships among public and private actors within “capturing coalitions” (Sergi & Vannucci, 2024). These coalitions, often supported by trust, shared experiences, and recurring exchanges, highlight the persistence and adaptability of corrupted networks over time. By focusing on governance mechanisms, the analysis investigates how public and private interests become interwoven, challenging traditional distinctions between these spheres and exposing vulnerabilities in institutional frameworks (Fazekas & Toth 2016; Bracking 2018). This research addresses two core questions: 1. What mechanisms govern the interactions between public and private actors in the formation of state capture? 2. How do political and institutional factors influence public governance, making certain sectors susceptible to capture? While state capture studies have traditionally centered on weak or developing states, this paper shifts the focus to an advanced democracy like Italy, renowned for its systemic corruption (della Porta & Vannucci, 2021). Italy’s institutional landscape provides fertile ground to examine how state capture can emerge even within robust formal structures, particularly in regions or sectors shaped by economic significance or the influence of criminal. The port of Genoa exemplifies a strategic environment where the interactions between public administration, politics, and private enterprise foster opportunities for corruption and regulatory capture (Carpenter & Moss 2013). By analyzing legal documents (e.g., court rulings, pre-trial detention requests) and media reports, the study investigates the construction of capturing coalitions, revealing how their configurations evolve over time in response to shifting regulatory and political landscapes. The paper aims to contribute to the literature by bridging gaps in the understanding of state capture’s relational and dynamic dimensions. It offers an empirical and processual perspective on the formation of capturing coalitions, illustrating how governance mechanisms, trust-based networks, and shared interests sustain their influence over time.