Populist Autocrats and Global Peacemaking in the 21st Century

The power base for many contemporary autocrats rely on the support of elites and upper middle-class segments of society that value participation and access to international trade, travel, and social networks. This produces limits with regards to the type and scope of repression autocrats can rely on to remain in power, and instead incentivizes them to invest in “soft power” to build reputation as legitimate and competent leaders. Such reputation-building prevails both domestically (developmentalism, populism) and on the international arena where they have incentives to dedicate resources and prestige into international public goods. This paper focuses on how autocrats have expanded their influence into efforts to limit or settle armed conflict around the world, both as members of international organizations, as individual states, or as parts of coalitions of the willing. I argue that populist autocrats are seeking to weaponize soft power by increasing their involvement as mediators, contributors to peacekeeping operations, and offering resources for post-conflict reconstruction. The effects of these involvements is a shift in how conflicts end, the content of peace settlements, and an advancement of authoritarian norms across the global system.