Regime Type and State Compliance in International Cooperation

Are autocracies less likely to comply with international rules than democracies? This question has become increasingly important in the face of ongoing autocratization and the growing political weight of autocratic powers, yet it has not been investigated systematically. We address this gap using an elite-level survey experiment involving 2000 high-level bureaucrats, who are key actors in the design and implementation of international treaties and whose preferences greatly impact states’ implementation of international agreements. Our sample consists of bureaucrats from ministries and state agencies representing ten different policy areas, and includes ten countries, covering democracies and autocracies in Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Americas. The conjoint experiment will expose respondents to different hypothetical treaties, varying in issue area, represented values, enforcement mechanisms, and the level of compliance from other democracies and autocracies, and measure how variation in these treatments affects their preferences for compliance with international agreements. We expect bureaucrats in democracies to be more likely to favor compliance than their autocratic counterparts, especially when agreements pertain to social and political reforms, and when they place weight on liberal values. Conversely, we expect the preferences of bureaucrats in autocracies and democracies to be more aligned when agreements primarily concern technocratic aspects of global governance, place weight on states’ autonomy, and are being complied with by most other autocracies. These findings carry important implications for the future of global governance, offering a nuanced understanding of how the increasing power of autocracies may shape different areas of international cooperation.