Federalism in Contested Societies

There are federal systems that have survived for a long time without a shared agreement on a viable federalism. What makes such systems hold together? Do federal-type entities that subsist without agreement on a shared sense of national community and national identity lack a viable federalism, or is there a sense of federal spirit that has been under-communicated in the existing federal body of literature? Contested entities are generally speaking lumped under the heading of multinational federation, but this body of literature is more concerned with how difference and diversity can be accommodated than with explaining why and how such entities hold together in the first place. Understanding the dynamics of process (towards stronger or weaker federal bonds and arrangements) requires paying attention to how federalism and federation interact. The former refers to the ideas, principles, and values that make up the federal political culture, the latter the specific institutional and structural arrangements. How do these factors on their own and together contribute to holding complex and contested systems together? These analytical categories can help spur conceptual and theoretical innovation by devising new forms of federation, of which I here specify the defining features of the multi-headed federation. This is not a normative model of federalism but a (temporary) resting point in a process of (de)federalization. It provides us with a sense of the nature and sources of institutionalized power, and how those with the power to shape the federation relate to it. What the current American experience appears to show is that we need to stop reifying distinct federal-institutional-constitutional models and instead: a) consider where in the (de)federalization process a given entity is; and b) establish that through criteria discerned from the core federal values and constitutional-democratic principles. By advocating a clearer distinction between federalism and federation my purpose is to increase the value of the federal normative currency by claiming that it can serve as a regulatory principle for social and political organizing and conflict handling. Every existing federation represents only an approximation to that principle, which can take two institutional forms, as presented here, namely reflexive federalism and constitutional federalism.