Counteracting Populist Distrust: The Role of Communicative Interventions by Constitutional Courts

Populist movements across Europe and the Americas increasingly frame constitutional courts as undemocratic institutions that obstruct the “will of the people.” This tension arises from the populist preference for unrestrained majoritarian rule, which often conflicts with the liberal democratic principles of checks and balances. While populist governments in countries such as Hungary, Poland, and Ecuador have attacked judicial independence, less is known about whether citizens with populist attitudes share these negative perceptions of judicial authority. Existing studies yield mixed results, suggesting that populist citizens may both value certain democratic safeguards and harbor skepticism toward institutions perceived as elitist. This duality underscores the importance of understanding the conditions under which judicial independence can maintain public support, particularly in polarized political climates. This study examines two key questions: (1) To what extent do populist attitudes among citizens influence support for judicial power? (2) Can communicative interventions by constitutional courts mitigate negative perceptions among populist citizens? The research employs a survey experiment embedded in the Austrian National Election Study (AUTNES), conducted ahead of Austria’s national elections (n = 3000). Respondents are presented with news articles describing real decisions by the Austrian Constitutional Court, such as overturning a headscarf ban or COVID-19 regulations. The design varies the content of these articles, with some including statements by the court president aimed at enhancing transparency and trust in judicial decision-making. Measures of support for judicial power include perceptions of the court’s fairness, independence, and role in democracy, with populist attitudes assessed using a validated populism scale. The study incorporates interactions between respondents’ policy preferences, court decisions, and communication interventions to evaluate the conditions under which support for judicial power is most affected. The study hypothesizes that (1) stronger populist attitudes correlate with lower support for judicial power; (2) alignment between a respondent’s policy preferences and court decisions amplifies or attenuates this relationship; and (3) transparent communication explaining judicial decisions enhances institutional trust, particularly when decisions conflict with individual preferences. Additionally, the research explores whether populist skepticism limits the effectiveness of such interventions. The findings aim to advance understanding of how constitutional courts can navigate legitimacy challenges in polarized societies. By identifying effective communication strategies, the study offers practical insights for courts seeking to maintain public trust amidst populist pressures.