An Integrated Social Norms Approach to Understanding Corrupt Equilibria

Drawing on a decade of applied social norms research, this paper argues that corruption is not merely consequence of individual malfeasance or institutional weaknesses but rather deeply ingrained social patterns sustained by shared beliefs, expectations, and informal institutions, which we term "bad norms". These norms create a self-reinforcing equilibrium, making non-compliance costly or futile even when individuals privately disapprove of corrupt practices. This perspective highlights the limitations of reforms which focus solely on formal rules and enforcement mechanism as such approaches often underestimate the underlying normative foundations that legitimise unethical exchanges and reciprocal obligations, thus perpetuating corruption as the default social norm. A key concept explored in the paper and evidenced by survey data gathered in Nigeria is pluralistic ignorance, where individuals privately reject corrupt practices but falsely assume widespread support thus perpetuating the status quo. Furthermore, the paper highlights the concept of norm traps and beliefs traps, illustrating how deeply ingrained social norms can create a sense of inevitability around corruption, contributing to resignation and a lack of collective action. The paper's methodological innovation lies in its integration of diverse theoretical frameworks from economics, sociology, political science, anthropology and social psychology to explicate the evolution of corrupt norms, institutions and beliefs. This innovation is also operationalised through four rounds of household surveys, ethnographic studies and experimental methods carried out by the Chatham House Africa Programme's Social Norms and Accountable Governance Project in partnership with the Centre for Social Norms and Behavioural Dynamics at the University of Pennsylvania. Using evidence from these studies, this paper introduces a comprehensive model that views corruption as a "suboptimal normative equilibrium", emphasising the interaction of formal and informal rules, individuals, collective action dilemmas, and deeply embedded cultural narratives. This integrated framework allows for a more nuanced understanding of the mechanisms sustaining corruption and offers potential avenues for effective intervention. The paper discusses the causal mechanisms of corruption using evidence from novel empirical studies to measure social expectations of corruption and ethnographic studies to examine the interplay between formal and informal institutions and local moral ecologies. In this way, the paper underscores the utility of mixed-methods research to build richer, more context-sensitive understanding of corruption within specific social and political contexts. Finally, the paper proposes a multi-faceted policy roadmap informed by this integrated framework.