The management of river systems that cross political boundaries necessitates cooperation among various jurisdictions, a challenge particularly evident in China due to its extensive network of waterways—over 1,500 rivers with drainage areas exceeding 1,000 square kilometers. This situation is further complicated by China's decentralized political system, where local governments engage in competitive water usage practices that foster conflicts, often termed "water wars," and hinder collaborative efforts among stakeholders along the riverbanks. Consequently, severe pollution is frequently observed in regions where jurisdictions converge.
Despite the urgent need for interjurisdictional collaboration, significant gaps exist in the literature regarding joint actions in water management within China. Previous studies primarily focused on conflicts arising between jurisdictions rather than on collaborative initiatives, often limiting their scope to intraprovincial cooperation or amalgamating interprovincial and inter-subprovincial relationships. This narrow focus fails to capture the complexities of cooperative dynamics among provinces, especially within China's authoritarian framework, which showcases centralization above the State Council but fragmentation between ministerial and provincial levels.
To address these deficiencies, this study draws on two interrelated research areas: collaborative governance and interjurisdictional environmental relationships. It formulates four hypotheses based on key theoretical concepts, including central intervention, economic disparities between provinces, the industrial makeup of upstream provinces, and existing water quality conditions.
The analysis employs Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) on 32 selected case studies to explore the relationship between these conditions and the presence or absence of interprovincial cooperation in shared water resources. Two primary models emerge to explain the factors fostering interprovincial collaboration. The first, the upstream-driven model, posits that when central intervention coincides with poor water quality, neighboring provinces are more likely to enter into cooperative agreements, particularly if the upstream province maintains lower pollution levels. Such cooperation benefits the upstream government by securing additional funding from the central and downstream governments aimed at improving water quality. The second, the downstream-driven model, suggests that economically stronger downstream provinces may be more inclined to procure cleaner water from upstream counterparts, especially when central intervention is present amid compromised water quality. This behavior may reflect either robust economic capacity or a heightened commitment to environmental protection.
In cases where cooperation is lacking, two potential solutions emerge. The first involves adherence to national water quality standards, which could inadvertently reduce cooperation between upstream and downstream provinces. The second arises when upstream provinces have significant industrial activity at their borders, leading neighboring provinces to be reluctant to cooperate due to concerns about industrial discharge regulation, which may jeopardize local tax revenues and economic growth.
This research makes significant contributions to existing scholarship by reinforcing the concept of environmental authoritarianism and highlighting the central government's crucial role in fostering cooperative water management. Additionally, it emphasizes the importance of economic interests in the upstream province as a key determinant of interprovincial collaboration. Despite ongoing central government efforts to combat pollution, local governments often prioritize economic growth, influenced by tax-sharing systems and GDP-driven policies, over environmental protection.
