First Impressions Matter: The Strategic Logic of Newcomer Parties’ Electoral Debuts

Over the last decade, newcomer parties have significantly reshaped party systems and political competition across European democracies. While extensive research has examined the factors influencing the success or failure of these parties and how established parties respond to new challengers, a critical gap remains in understanding how newcomer parties decide in which elections to compete first. Early electoral success is pivotal for these parties, enhancing voter awareness and securing the resources necessary to sustain their operations. This decision is especially consequential in the European Union’s multilevel political system, where new parties face the strategic choice of contesting sub-national, national, or supranational elections. This paper addresses this gap by presenting a game-theoretic model that challenges conventional expectations. Contrary to the assumption that new parties avoid strong competition during their initial electoral campaigns, our model demonstrates that these parties strategically choose to debut in the strongholds of their closest competitors. To test our theoretical expectations, we analyse original data on the electoral debuts of 202 newcomer parties from 13 European democracies. Our findings provide novel empirical insights into how newcomer parties navigate early strategic decisions that shape their political trajectories. By highlighting the interplay between electoral choice and competitive dynamics, this study makes a significant contribution to the literature on the evolution of party systems and the strategies of political challengers in Europe’s complex multilevel governance context.