Who to Include into Knowledge Practices?

Under the heading of epistemic injustice, knowledge-related inequalities and forms of discrimination have recently gained some attention. This paper deals with the question of how to remedy epistemic injustices. It focuses on the practical, institutional challenge of how to approximate diversity and inclusion without jeopardizing the quality of knowledge, and how to resolve the tensions that intensify when normative demands are high. In a first step, the problem of epistemic injustice is defined by distinguishing Miranda Fricker’s discourse-related forms of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice from ‘access-denying’ forms of epistemic injustice that are caused by being excluded from knowledge acquiring, production and dissemination regimes. In a second step, the paper explores the remedies that democratic institutions provide for these different forms of epistemic injustice, responding to the so far rather vague hope, expressed in studies of epistemic injustice, that ‘democracy’ might be the solution. The study then zooms in on the tricky question of who to include in knowledge practices. While it seems clear that diversity is a democratic as well as an epistemic asset, it is far from straightforward how diversity translates into real-life institutions. Who should have access to knowledge practices, who to believe and how to choose between conflicting expertise? These questions are particularly pressing in policy settings where voice aggregation needs to be ensured and open access is usually not an option.