Conflict-Driven Combinations of Deliberative Mini-Publics and Direct Democratic Instruments: Insights from Germany.

Deliberative mini-publics are increasingly implemented in democratic processes around the world, and since the systemic turn, scholars have devoted growing attention to how they connect with and relate to other democratic institutions and practices. Alongside representative bodies, mini-publics are often combined with direct democratic instruments to set agendas (e.g., British Columbia, Ontario, or Ireland) or to inform voters (e.g., Citizens’ Initiative Review in Oregon). In these cases, both innovations are intentionally combined by design. However, conflict-driven ad hoc combinations remain largely unexplored, despite their growing importance for practice and for understanding of how different democratic innovations interact. This paper is among the first to explore these conflict-driven combinations, e.g., when a parliament convenes a mini-public to channel a citizens’ initiative or to address an ambiguous referendum outcome or conversely, when a citizens’ initiative demands a referendum to override a mini-public’s recommendation. In contrast to combinations by design, conflict-driven combinations emerge in response to a deliberative or direct democratic process in order to manage or solve a conflict. Although these forms increasingly occur in real-world politics, we know little about their consequences for meaningful combinations. This paper addresses this gap by drawing evidence from five cases at the local and regional level in Germany, using a comparative case study approach based on in-depth document analysis and interviews with local councils, citizens’ initiatives and other stakeholders. Specifically, it asks: What trade-offs and opportunities do conflict-driven combinations create? Preliminary analysis suggests that while they can have negative effects (e.g., undermining a part of a participatory process), they can also provide unique opportunities for strengthening the deliberative quality and the acceptance of outcomes. The paper makes two key contributions to advance our understanding of these forms of combinations. First, conceptually, by introducing conflict-driven combinations, it refines existing classifications that focus primarily on pre-designed combinations with referenda, neglecting initiative instruments. Second, empirically, it sheds light on how these mechanisms can interact in practice, when democratic innovations meet under contentious conditions. The findings thus speak to the broader debate about how democratic innovations can be meaningfully combined in representative systems — not only when they are carefully designed but also when they emerge unexpectedly in the midst of political contestation.