Federalizzazione Dell’Italia: the Transition of the Italian Political System Through the Lenses of Constructivist Institutionalism

Italy is a state standing at the crossroads of federalization. Being a unitary state with significant regional autonomy that exists under the umbrella of cooperative federalism, there is a conflict between the national and subnational levels of governance over the exclusive competencies that both levels of governance possess. This article traces the ideational and practical application of the federalization process in Italy from the lenses of the constructivist institutional theory by Colin Hay and with the application of process-tracing methodology. The research concentrated on the critical junctures and the ideas behind each stage of federalization since the Tangentopoli crisis of the 1990s. The research findings demonstrate that, firstly, federalization in Italy is an elite-driven process, where the politicians’ interpretation of Italian federalism affects the outcome of institutional change. Secondly, federalism is a politicized idea, which Italian society and political elite interpret as “the tool for efficient governance” or “the remedy for corruption.” Thirdly, federalism is a supplementary topic in the Italian discourse, which yields ideas connected with economic, social, and political reforms, reinforcing their legitimacy for the voters. Lastly, the paper discusses the prospects of federalization under Giorgia Meloni’s government in the context of the current discourse on the Grand Constitutional reform.