Oligarchic Networks of Influence and Legislatures in Developing Democracies: Evidence from Ukraine

State capture by wealthy elites is a widespread phenomenon in developing democracies, yet the mechanisms through which it works and the impact it has on political and policy outcomes remain poorly understood. In this research, I develop a network-based approach to studying captured legislatures and argue that, in the context of a competitive political environment and weak rule of law, oligarchs defend their wealth by promoting as members of parliament individuals who are linked to them via interpersonal ties. Using social network and regression analyses of unique administrative and investigative data, as well as original qualitative data from elite interviews, I uncover the hidden networks of interpersonal connections among nearly 1,000 legislators and oligarchs in Ukraine over the course of two parliamentary convocations (2014–2024) and demonstrate that these networks facilitate the adoption of policies that align with oligarchs’ economic interests and shape policymaking more broadly. My research design also allows to compare the structure and behavior of oligarchic networks in Ukraine's national legislature before and after Russia's full-scale invasion and draw evidence-based conclusions about the future of legislative state capture in the country. My study provides important insights for understanding money in politics, oligarchy, state capture, neopatrimonialism, legislative politics, and political representation.