Strategic Staffing in Politics: The Role of Local Brokers and Patronage in Brazilian Federal Elections

Recent studies have shown that politicians often utilize brokers with the ability to mobilize votes to enhance their electoral success. Globally, one common way to reward brokers is by offering public employment through patronage practices. While most research on legislative staff focuses on their activities within congressional settings, new and unpublished data from Brazil reveal that legislative aides are often hired from local governments. This raises suspicions that the majority of legislative staff are selected as part of a strategy that connects local and national politics. The Brazilian context provides a valuable setting for this analysis. At the federal level, the open-list proportional representation (OLPR) electoral system emphasizes candidate-centered campaigns, and congressional regulations allow and financially support legislators in hiring personal staff. Additionally, at the local level, Brazil's approximately 5,000 municipalities play a crucial role in the electoral success of federal candidates. Leveraging closely contested elections, I use a regression discontinuity design to test whether party turnover in municipal elections stimulates the hiring and firing of federal legislative aides. When local governments remain unchanged, federal incumbents should have no incentive to hire or fire aides from the municipality. However, when there is a turnover, federal incumbents need to refresh their staff to secure support in upcoming elections. The results have the potential to contribute to the literature on government levels, brokers, and patronage, demonstrating that national-level politicians must consider local power holders when strategically selecting aides.