Mafiocracy Alla Turca: The JDP Years

The Justice and Development Party (JDP) is in power in Turkey since 2002. As of 2025, deep poverty prevails, the separation of powers, any system of checks and balances, trust in the legal system, freedom of speech, to say the least, are long gone. The state as such is run as a joint criminal enterprise under an almost impenetrable shield of impunity. How come, and so what? Throughout the years, JDP has built a monopoly on the creation and distribution of rent, legal and illegal, to enrich the so-called big Boss and his clan, and a third generation of party members, without losing an election. As for rent creation and distribution, most public biddings are hand delivered to party loyalists by circumnavigating the legal barriers. In Public-Private Partnership projects, for the bridges that no one passes, or airports that nothing lands, a certain traffic is being guaranteed and the absence of passengers are compensated. On the darker side, tons of cocaine are confiscated at Mersin Port every year, yet the cases are swept under the rug. As for providing guns to radical jihadists in Syria, only the journalists that uncovered the scandal are brought to justice. Allegedly, sons of higher-ups were involved in the transportation and sale of Iraqi and ISIS oil, and plundered museum pieces from war zones –it is not newsworthy at all. All crime bosses are welcome, if they come with their money. They can buy a house, get a citizenship, and change their names to avoid Interpol lists. If they are arrested, there are always certain lawyers who know certain judges, while the criminal walks off. Zindashti’s release was alleged to be guaranteed by an ex-JDP MP, calling from the Palace. Reza Zarrab, under the wings of the Turkish state, and the ruling party sold Iranian oil through Turkey, for a payment in gold. He was applauded as the person who has closed Turkey’s foreign deficit, most probably through the alarmingly high item of ‘Net Errors and Omissions’ in the Balance of Payments. In a picture like this, it is hard to define, let alone work with the categories such like corruption, state capture, organized crime, state crime or mafia. The aim of this paper is to draw an outline of the Turkish case, by challenging the premise that captor groups or organized criminals come from “outside” the formal economy, state apparatus, or the ruling party. It is possible that formally and legally elected government, through its party apparatus, can take over the state. The Rule of Law, as a principle, can be thrown aside, leaving a deep hole of a-legality. For mafia and Turkey, it is worth to remember the saying, “se tutto ѐ mafia, nulla ѐ mafia.” As such, I will attempt to formulate the alla Turca, starting from the relationship between income/profit maximization and a-legality, and building on the state and governments’ role in changing or erasing the thin line between legality and illegality.