Democratic Backsliding in the South: the Case of Greece During and After the Crisis

This paper aims to examine whether democratic backsliding can be observed in the case of Greece during and after the Eurozone crisis. There has been a considerable literature on the prevalence and quality of democracy worldwide with a branch of the literature focusing on developments aiming or leading to erosion of established democratic rights and principles, such as the rule of law, a system of check and balances, independent judiciary and constitutional integrity under the umbrella of the concept of “democratic backsliding”. In the European Union (EU), democratic backsliding, broadly understood in this paper as an attempt from executive actors to erode democratic institutions, such as the independence of free media, the judiciary and the wider system of constitutional check and balances preventing executive overreach, is mostly used for regarding developments in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) – especially in the cases of Hungary and Poland. This paper aims to examine whether (and if so why/why not) democratic backsliding can be applied in other parts of the EU periphery such as Southern Europe which has also a history of authoritarianism, problematic democratic transitions and weak civil society. More specifically, the paper aims to examine whether democratic backsliding can be applied to the Greek case in terms of quality of democratic institutions, media and the justice system. The main areas of investigation will be: i) the SYRIZA-ANEL efforts to reshape Greece’s media landscape in 2016 (for which the responsible Minister Nikos Pappas was found guilty for dereliction of duty); ii) the suggested politicisation of the justice system where 10 opposition figures including former Premiers and Bank of Greece Governor were accused and later acquitted for bribery from Novartis; iii) the accusations against current Greek Premier Mitsotakis for an extensive surveillance operation of journalists and political opponents.