EU Democracy Promotion in Times of External Competition and Internal Dissensus: The Case of Armenia

While Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine changed the way the EU thinks about its relations with Eastern neighbours such as Armenia, Russia’s position on the Armenian Azerbaijani conflicts since 2020 has transformed Armenia’s thinking about its relations with the EU. Armenia’s 2018 Velvet revolution had already laid the groundwork for closer relations with Europe and the West through its rejection of autocracy, its embrace of liberalism as well as its ouster of a political class that had close links to the Russian political establishment. Following Armenia’s 44-day war with Azerbaijan in 2020 and the exodus of Karabakh Armenians in late 2023, public opinion and the Armenian government’s position on Russia changed dramatically due to the perception that the erstwhile ally had let them down. At the same time, the profound shock of having lost Nagorno Karabakh and an influx of displaced Karabakh Armenians led to unprecedented polarisation within Armenian society. Faced with major contestation, prime minister Nikol Pashinyan – the leader of the 2018 Velvet revolution – began to exhibit authoritarian tendencies himself. Meanwhile, the EU’s efforts to sustain and support both Armenia’s democratic transition and its strategic reorientation towards the Euro-Atlantic institutions were and continue to be delayed by internal dissensus, with individual member states slowing down support packages aimed at supporting Armenian security and reducing its dependence on Russia or measures such as the visa liberalisation dialogue. In exploring these dynamics, this paper seeks to provide a better understanding of how the EU’s approach to democracy promotion is shaped by both its global competition with the autocratic international, including the compromises between strategic interests and democratic principles that this competition involves, as well as the EU’s internal dissensus over the liberal democratic script and its promotion in third states.