Variations in the authority of economics and the fate of technocratic legitimacy: central bankers and the creation of a new epistemic order?

Central bank independence is a direct illustration of the political influence of modern economics. Yet, since the Great Recession, some observers have noticed a decline in the authority of economic knowledge and a growing contestation of expertise. Against this background, this article studies the effect of the variation in the epistemic authority of economists in the public debate on the strategy of central bankers to defend technocratic legitimacy – a precondition of central bank independence. More specifically, the article asks whether central banks resist the decline in the political influence of economics or contribute to it, by notably increasing the influence of other disciplines. The empirical analysis is conducted in relation to the case of the European Central Bank, known as one of the most independent central banks. To assess the influence of economics vis-à-vis other disciplines over time in the ECB, this article mostly uses methods of quantitative text analysis. The article looks at the credibility of economists and economics in the communication of the central bank. In addition, it also considers the place of economists inside the institution. The findings of this article will inform the potential strategy of central bankers to broaden the frontier of technocratic legitimacy beyond economics.