Competing political loyalties? Commission–industry engagement in European defence

Russia’s war against Ukraine and the EU’s expanding defence ambitions have heightened the strategic importance of the European defence industry in Brussels. Yet little is known about how defence firms lobby EU institutions or how receptive the European Commission is to such influence. This article offers the first systematic analysis of defence-industry lobbying at the EU level, examining the conditions under which the Commission engages with the defence sector. Drawing on liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism, we derive competing expectations that point to two distinct logics of defence lobbying: national lines versus supranational, functional dynamics. Empirically, we map the lobbying activities of 174 defence firms and associations—including major SIPRI Top 100 producers, European industry groups, and selected third-country actors—using data from the EU Transparency Register (2019–2024). Our findings show that Commission engagement is concentrated in Cabinets with defence-relevant competences and among powerful, well-resourced organisations with a strong Brussels presence, consistent with a functionalist logic. At the same time, meeting patterns display a national reflex, with interactions more likely when Commissioners and industry actors share a country of origin. These results raise important normative concerns regarding equality of access and the national political dynamics that may constrain the Commission’s supranational mandate.