When Power Shapes Perception: Partisan Asymmetries in Inequality Evaluations of Voters and Politicians in Illiberal Hungary

This paper addresses a critical puzzle in the study of economic inequality perceptions: why do citizens' inequality assessments diverge so dramatically from objective economic indicators, and how does political supply respond—or fail to respond—to this disconnect? Using Hungary as a paradigmatic case, we propose that in illiberal contexts, government incumbency creates a distinct "perception bonus" that transcends traditional ideological divides. Drawing on mixed methods—original face-to-face survey data (N=964) and elite interviews—we find striking evidence of partisan perceptual gaps. Fidesz supporters (41% of the electorate) rate inequality significantly lower than non-voters and opposition party supporters, despite Hungary having among the EU's highest objective inequality levels. Crucially, right-wing opposition voters (Mi Hazánk) perceive inequality similarly to left-opposition voters, suggesting that opposition status matters more than ideology—a finding that challenges conventional left-right frameworks of redistributive politics. This disconnect extends to policy preferences. While perceiving less inequality, government supporters also demand 50% less redistribution compared to non-voters (1.55 vs 2.05 on a 0-5 scale). However, economic insecurity emerges as a powerful cross-cutting predictor (β=0.25, p<0.001), suggesting that material conditions can penetrate partisan filters. These results have profound implications for democratic quality and political stability. When 41% of voters perceive a fundamentally different economic reality than the opposition, political competition shifts from debating policy solutions to contesting problem definition itself. This perceptual polarization may explain why rising inequality fails to generate electoral consequences in illiberal contexts, thereby reinforcing inequality's persistence. Our ongoing elite interviews (fieldwork in progress) are expected to reveal that politicians tailor their policy solutions to incumbency advantages and the electoral potential of different voter segments in upcoming parliamentary elections, rather than to objective inequality levels.