ECPR

Install the app

Install this application on your home screen for quick and easy access when you’re on the go.

Just tap Share then “Add to Home Screen”

Reversing the Tide: Explaining the Rise of Parliamentary Initiative in France

Executives
Institutions
Parliaments
Coalition
Decision Making
Julien Navarro
Université catholique de Lille
Julien Navarro
Université catholique de Lille

To access full paper downloads, participants are encouraged to install the official Event App, available on the App Store.


Abstract

The French Parliament is widely considered one of Europe’s weakest legislatures, both in its law-making and oversight capacities (Sieberer, 2011). Under the so-called parlementarisme rationalisé of the Fifth Republic, parliamentary initiative is constrained not only by constitutional limits on the scope of legislation (article 34 of the Constitution) but also by the government’s control of the parliamentary agenda (Huber, 1996). Yet, Members of Parliament are not entirely powerless, and the balance between executive and legislative authority has evolved over time (Kerrouche, 2006). In recent years, this dynamic has shifted dramatically. Since 2021, the number of parliamentary-initiated laws (propositions de loi) has surpassed government-sponsored bills (projets de loi), defying both traditional institutional expectations and broader trends of executive dominance. This unexpected reversal raises critical questions about the interplay of France’s political institutions. This paper addresses this puzzle through a twofold approach. First, it systematically analyzes trends in legislative initiation, comparing the share of laws originating from Parliament and the government, as well as those proposed by majority and opposition factions in both the National Assembly and the Senate. It also explores how these trends intersect with the growing reliance on executive orders (décrets) and exceptional procedures, such as ordonnances. Second, drawing on existing theories of legislative production (Tsebelis, 1999), the paper seeks to explain the shifting equilibrium between Parliament and the government. We argue that this transformation stems from two key factors: constitutional reforms—some explicitly aimed at empowering Parliament—and evolving partisan dynamics. Crucially, the Parliament’s growing influence appears to be a countervailing response to the declining popular support for executive actors (the presidency and government) over recent decades. Keywords: coalition politics; executive-legislative relations; France; law-making; legislative initiative; parliament