“Molto Fumo, Poco Arrosto?” Smoke Without Substance in Giorgia Meloni’s Government?

The Italian expression “molto fumo, poco arrosto”—literally “much smoke, little roast”—captures a common perception about populist radical right (PRR) actors once they enter government: their rhetoric was incendiary, yet their policy output appears limited. This metaphor provides the analytical starting point for this article, which interrogates whether the gap between discourse (“the smoke”) and policy outcomes (“the roast”) in Giorgia Meloni’s government should be read as evidence of moderation, institutional constraint, or a more subtle mode of illiberal transformation. The rise of PRR parties across Western democracies has sparked renewed debate on their ideological character, electoral appeal, and potential to reshape liberal democratic systems. In Europe—where member states operate within dense constitutional and supranational constraints—scholars disagree on whether such actors can meaningfully challenge liberal values or whether institutional embeddedness tempers their governing capacity. A core argument in this debate is the apparent inconsistency between the radical promises of PRR parties in opposition and their behaviour once in power. Italy offers a crucial case. Fratelli d’Italia (FdI) won the 2022 elections, giving birth, toghther with the its colation parties, to the first PRR-led government in Western Europe. Expectations of abrupt policy rupture were widespread. Yet, after three years in government, many observers have described Meloni’s approach as unexpectedly pragmatic or even conventional, noting the abandonment of some extreme proposals. This reading implicitly assumes that the fulfilment of radical pledges is the primary measure of populist impact. This article challenges that assumption. Rather than interpreting the distance between discourse and policy as evidence of moderation, we argue that it reflects a different mode of operation: incremental, strategic, and capable of challenging the liberal order without overt institutional rupture. Conceptually, the article revisits debates on populism and the PRR to clarify how the ambivalence and ideological elasticity of populism complicate assessments of its impact. The absence of spectacular institutional change—the missing “fireworks”—can obscure more gradual processes of democratic erosion, norm reframing, and institutional repurposing. Empirically, the article compares FdI’s discourse while in opposition with its actions in government across two key policy areas: migration and European integration. Migration represents the domestic arena in which sovereignty and identity claims are mobilized, while European integration embodies external constraints and membership in a rule-based supranational system. Although FdI has not enacted its most extreme proposals—such as naval blockades or pathways toward EU exit—our analysis shows that the government has nevertheless advanced measures and narratives that politicize institutions, delegitimize liberal norms, and promote a sovereigntist reinterpretation of democratic and European governance. We argue that Meloni’s government exemplifies a form of “low-intensity illiberalism”: less dramatic than feared, yet cumulatively corrosive. The article thus contributes to debates on how PRR actors govern, how rhetoric and policy interact, and how liberal orders may erode even when formal continuity remains intact.