Social Conflicts and Liberal Parties

Liberal parties are historically foundational actors, central to state‑ and EU‑building, democratic transitions, and the consolidation of the rule of law in Western European countries. They have also been key contemporary governing forces, frequently part of national executives and pivotal for European Parliamentary majorities. Yet liberal parties have paradoxically attracted limited scholarly attention compared to other party families. Existing supply-side accounts portray liberals as a ‘thin’ party family, marked by pragmatism, adaptability, and ideological fluidity, and defined largely in negative terms, by what sets them apart from other mainstream party families. However, demand-side analyses of liberals’ electoral anchoring in traditional and new social conflicts remain rare. This paper fills this gap and asks whether liberals form a coherent party family from the perspective of voters. Specifically, it investigates which social conflicts liberal parties represent in Western Europe and whether the structuring role of these conflicts varies across countries, cleavage origins, and subtypes of liberalism. We use original survey data collected in six Western European democracies: Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK. Methodologically, the study innovates by locating individuals in multiple social conflicts - both traditional Rokkanian conflicts and newer ones related to post‑materialism and globalization - rather than relying solely on sociodemographic markers or standard issue preference batteries. Analyses reveal that conflict positions related to both the industrial revolution (pro-urban and pro-employers) and post-materialism/globalization (pro-cosmopolitanism and pro-LGBTQ+ rights) correlate with support for liberal parties. However, a closer examination of country-by-country models shows that only conflict dimensions related to individual rights – above all, traditionalism versus support for LGBTQ+ rights - consistently predict voting for liberal parties across all countries. This finding supports the claim that the minimal common denominator of the liberal party family lies in its alignment with individual rights and freedoms. At the same time, the results uncover marked intra‑family variation. The ways in which other social conflicts relate to liberal voting differ according to parties’ historical cleavage origins and subtypes of liberalism. The paper advances the study of this neglected party family, and refines the conceptualization of liberalism as a party family. In doing so, it contributes to broader debates on how old and new social conflicts continue to structure voting behaviour in Western Europe.