Multi-Level Governance Networks and Political Lock-In in Indonesia’s Coal-Based Energy System

Despite international commitments to reduce carbon emissions, Indonesia continues its dependency on coal. This persistence cannot be fully explained by technological constraints or financial barriers alone. It requires closer attention to political dynamics embedded in energy governance. This paper investigates how energy governance institutions and multi-level governance networks contribute to a political lock-in that reinforces coal dependency in Indonesia. Drawing on concepts of carbon lock-in and network governance, we conduct a qualitative analysis of governance networks across national, provincial, and municipal levels. Through six months of fieldwork in Jakarta and two coal-dependent regions, Muara Enim in South Sumatera, and Kutai Kartanegara in East Kalimantan. This study maps interactions among a wide range of actors. They include state institutions, state-owned enterprises, capital owners, politicians, security forces, civil society organizations, academia, and international actors. The findings show that coal dependency is sustained through fragmented yet highly interdependent governance networks. These networks are characterized by patron-client relations, clientelist practices, and informal rules that operate alongside formal institutional arrangements. Energy governance in Indonesia is characterized by shifting coalitions, policy negotiations, and strategic alliances that consistently favor incumbent coal interests. Collaboration and conflict coexist within these networks. The involvement of subnational governments and security actors further embeds coal within local political economies. Empirically, the study finds that informal Civil Society Organizations play an active role in mediating coal activities, particularly at the subnational level. In East Kalimantan, these actors operate as brokers within governance networks, extracting rents, enforcing informal compliance, and employing coercive practices that include intimidation and positive incentives to the opposition. The paper argues that political lock-in in Indonesia emerges from complex governance networks dynamics rather than centralized resistance to change. By conceptualizing the coal dependency as a product of governance network dynamics, this paper contributes to energy governance and carbon lock-in literature and highlights the need for network-sensitive interventions in Indonesia energy transition.