Conspiracy Mentality as a Non-Ideological Driver of EU Attitudes in Iceland

As the current centre-left government in Iceland moves toward a national referendum on resuming EU accession negotiations, public attitudes remain sharply polarized, with right-leaning voters consistently more Eurosceptic. The prospect of intensified disinformation campaigns in the run-up to the referendum, including efforts by actors inside and outside Iceland, further raises the political stakes. In this context, it becomes theoretically and practically important to examine whether conspiracy mentality, defined as a general propensity to attribute hidden motives and manipulative intent to authorities, constitutes a non-ideological reservoir of Euroscepticism independent of the familiar left-right divide. Using survey data from an Icelandic convenience sample (N = 463), I examine how support for continued accession negotiations and perceived benefits of EU membership relate to three forms of conspiratorial thinking: general conspiracy mentality (CMQ), belief in a specific domestic political conspiracy concerning the former Prime Minister, and attitudes toward people who believe in conspiracy theories. Results indicate two independent and unrelated pathways to EU skepticism. First, an ideological pathway: individuals positioning themselves further to the right express more negative attitudes toward EU membership (r approx .30 to .40). Second, a conspiratorial pathway: CMQ strongly predicts Euroscepticism (r approx .40) despite being unrelated to left-right ideology (r approx .00). Belief in the conspiracy concerning the former Prime Minister also correlates with EU opposition (r approx .30), suggesting spillover from domestic elite-focused mistrust to international political preferences. Moreover, perceiving conspiracy believers as “seeking truth in a society where trust is lacking” independently predicts stronger Euroscepticism (r approx .25), underscoring the role of broader mistrust-based orientations in shaping views on European integration. Together, these findings demonstrate that public opinion on EU accession is shaped not only by ideological commitments but also by distrust-based orientations, implying heightened public susceptibility to strategic disinformation during the referendum campaign