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Supranational Bureaucracies, Member States, and the Politics of Shaming: The Interactive Dynamics of International Organizations’ Reaction to Conflicts (2000-2024)

Foreign Policy
Institutions
International Relations
Andrea Knapp
Universität Potsdam
Andrea Knapp
Universität Potsdam
Giovanni Agostinis
Università di Bologna
Paolo Stohlman
Università di Bologna

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Abstract

Why do some International Organizations (IOs) publicly condemn violators of international norms yet others remain silent? Despite growing scholarly attention to inter-state “naming and shaming” as a instrument of foreign policy and global governance, we lack evidence on the conditions under which IOs choose to shame norm violators. The paper addresses this research gap by investigating the responses of 73 IOs to armed conflicts between 2000 and 2024. Compiling an original dataset on IO shaming, we distinguish the statements by IO supranational bureaucracies (e.g., secretariats) from those voiced by representatives of states in intergovernmental decision-making bodies (e.g., councils or assemblies). We develop a novel theory centered on the interactive relations between supranational and intergovernmental shaming in IOs. On the one hand, we argue that supranational shaming responds to political signals from member states. IO officials are more likely to condemn violators if influential member states have already expressed their disapproval in domestic settings, since it enhances the legitimacy of bureaucratic actions. On the other hand, cases of supranational shaming then catalyze state reactions by shaping diplomatic discourse and creating the reputational pressures on members to take public positions, resulting in subsequent intergovernmental shaming. To evaluate the bidirectional relations, we examine the temporal sequences of shaming statements. Our outcomes show that bureaucratic condemnation generally follows intergovernmental shaming, indicating that IO officials respond to diplomatic cues from members. However, when bureaucrats speak first –particularly in organizations with high levels of authority delegation to supranational bureaucracies– they increase the likelihood of subsequent intergovernmental shaming by the same organizations. The paper contributes to scholarship on IO shaming and performance.