Can Genealogical Critique Harm Democracy?

Genealogical critique has been widely promoted as a tool for identifying illegitimate forms of oppression (Geuss; Williams) and for actively advancing democratic freedom (Prinz and Raekstad). More recently, analytic philosophers have argued that genealogy can enhance people’s lives by uncovering the actual functions of their concepts, values, and social practices (Queloz). Despite this enthusiasm, a growing body of work has begun to emphasize the risks associated with genealogical critique. However, existing critiques typically focus on the genealogical approaches of particular thinkers, such as Foucault (Harcourt) or Nietzsche (Pearson), and do not directly address the ways in which different types of genealogy might be dangerous for democracy in different way. In this paper, I examine three prominent forms of genealogical critique commonly employed for political emancipation: critical genealogy (e.g., Geuss), vindicatory genealogy (e.g., Queloz), and possibilizing genealogy (e.g., Lorenzini). I analyze the distinct dangers associated with each approach, with particular attention to their implications for democratic emancipation. I argue that no form of genealogical critique is risk-free and conclude that theorists should always undertake a careful assessment of the potential democratic risks before deploying genealogical methods.