Does Disinformation Undermine Democracy? A Theoretical Exploration

It is a commonly held belief that disinformation undermines democracy. The corrosive effect of false or misleading information can be traced back to various influential theories informing Western democracies, including Schumpeterian pluralism, Popperian piecemeal engineering, and Habermasian deliberative democracy. Briefly, these perspectives share the view that facts function as the cement of consensus and epistemic progress; efforts to obscure or undermine credence in these facts thus foments a cycle of destructive dissensus. Post-truth politics, in this reading, does not align with democracy and in fact actively undermines it. In addition, theories of anti-democratic authoritarianism emphasise the chilling effects emanating from disinformation, such as polarisation (essentialisation and stereotyping), participatory repression (silencing and doxing), and disorientation and mischaracterisation (slander, defamation, radical de-contextualisation). The above-sketched description raises serious concerns regarding the systemic risks of disinformation, and would arguably suggest the need for some form of systemic regulation of information flows. However, in its practical implications, a defence of this position runs into important limits and internal contradictions. First, the above-described perspectives are all characterised by a formal-institutional orientation. This means that democratic processes are projected onto state institutions, in a theory in which (liberal) processual values aimed at expedient decision making and the delimitations of powers are central characteristics, while substantive values are (necessarily) disregarded as a societal affair. Institutions’ claims to distinguish correct from incorrect information would significantly enhance their elite character, reproducing inequalities and raising entry barriers to democratic participation. Second, regulating disinformation fits poorly with notions of an open democratic society which revolves around the contestation of ideas. In such a society, the desire for knowledge and progress is considered a near-intrinsic characteristic, and the ‘policing of truth’, particularly by central authorities, runs counter to the essence of the system. Dialectic, contingency-based, or radical versions of liberal democracy all share a deep distrust of censorship as repressive and obstructive: ‘take care of freedom and truth will take care of itself’ (Rorty). Third, all of the above-mentioned theories acknowledge that society must be accommodated within the democratic model. Societal democracy emphasises the decentred nature of democratic societies, characterised by the notion of the ‘empty throne’. Here, democracy is constantly embodied and expressed in a myriad of settings and contexts, each with their own ethos. The reliance on a ‘truth criterion’ for full democratic participation might be deemed an untenable, even absurd notion where democracy manifests itself in a tapestry-like, iterative process. Democracy thus stands in a complex relation to disinformation, in which the latter might reveal not only malevolent, destructive, and criminal intent, but alternatively also deep-seated societal disagreements over truth (epistemic crisis) or even –quite ‘trivially’– the good life (value contestation). The proposed paper further unpacks this complex relation. It explores the potential of an intersubjective, contestation- and dissensus-oriented perspective as a way forward, in which trust, not truth, forms the central concern. Using illustrative empirical examples, it further calls for clearer differentiation between the manifold manifestations enabling an engagement with disinformation that preserves the integrity of the democratic system.