When Proportional Feels Unaccountable: Citizen Demand for Reform Under Serbia’s Nationwide Closed-List PR

Proportional representation (PR) is commonly defended as the fairest way to translate votes into seats. Yet the “dark side” of PR often lies not in proportionality per se, but in specific institutional combinations that reshape incentives and weaken citizen-elite linkage. Serbia is an illustrative case: parliamentary elections are conducted in a single nationwide district using closed, blocked party lists. While this design maximizes national proportionality, it plausibly intensifies a classic principal-agent problem: voters cannot reward or sanction individual representatives, and candidates’ careers depend primarily on party leadership rather than on building ties to territorial constituencies. The result may be an accountability anomaly – high proportionality accompanied by low perceived responsiveness, weak personal linkage, and a sense of territorial underrepresentation. This paper studies whether – and why – citizens in Serbia demand reforms that would increase either (1) individual accountability (opening party lists to allow preference voting) or (2) territorial representativeness (increasing the number of electoral districts). We draw on existing nationally representative polling for descriptive baseline patterns and field new nationally representative survey waves (N≈1,200 per wave), embedding survey experiments to test how competing frames shape reform support. Descriptive evidence from recent polling already indicates broad demand for personalization: roughly seven in ten respondents support direct voting for named candidates rather than only party lists, while a sizable share of politically unattached citizens remain undecided – suggesting substantial scope for informational and framing effects. The baseline survey module will measure satisfaction with the electoral system; perceived accountability (whether representatives answer to voters, parties, or party leaders); external political efficacy; perceived territorial linkage (e.g., whether one’s municipality is effectively represented); and support for the two reform directions (open lists; more electoral districts). The experimental component will randomize short descriptions of feasible reform proposals and contrast a benefit frame – greater voter control over individual representatives (open lists) or stronger local linkage (more districts) – with alternative frames emphasizing realistic trade-offs: higher ballot complexity and risk of invalid voting, intensified candidate rivalry within parties, and less clear responsibility due to greater bargaining among political actors. Outcomes include reform support, perceived accountability and territorial representation, expected complexity, and turnout intentions. We expect two main findings. First, demand for reform will be strongly associated with perceived party-centered accountability and weak territorial linkage, consistent with the principal-agent logic of nationwide closed-list PR. Second, support for reforms will remain high under some trade-off frames but will be sensitive to others, allowing us to identify which perceived costs citizens are willing to accept for greater control and linkage. By linking a distinctive PR design to citizen preferences and experimentally identifying the persuasive power of competing arguments, the paper contributes to public-choice accounts of electoral-rule incentives and provides actionable diagnostics for reform debates in party-dominant and hybrid regime contexts.