The Role of Political Will in Shaping the Use and Effectiveness of Sanctions Against Organised Crime

There is growing recognition that sanctions outcomes are contingent not only on technical design and implementation, but also on the political and geopolitical dynamics surrounding their use. Preliminary research identified political will in host countries as a decisive factor influencing outcomes in two contrasting cases: Colombia and Libya. While political support in Colombia was central to the perceived effectiveness of sanctions designations, limited domestic cooperation in Libya significantly constrained their impact. However, the scope and timeframe of earlier studies limited deeper examination of why political will varied so markedly across cases. The paper conceptualises political will as a relational and multi-level phenomenon, examining it from two interlinked perspectives: that of sanction-sending states and multilateral actors, and that of the home states of individuals targeted by organised crime-related sanctions. On the sending side, the research explores what drives or constrains decisions to impose sanctions in the organised crime space, including alignment with domestic and foreign policy objectives, geopolitical considerations, targeting strategies (including distinctions between state and non-state actors), institutional capacity, and clarity regarding the intended objectives of sanctions use. As preliminary research suggests, a defining feature of organised crime-related sanctions is the exceptionally large and diffuse pool of potential targets, which raises unresolved questions about prioritisation, selectivity, and strategic coherence. Persistent opacity surrounding sanctions decision-making - particularly among key sender states - renders this process a policy ‘black box’, limiting transparency, accountability, and opportunities for informed engagement by external stakeholders. The paper also examines political will within the home states of sanctioned individuals, focusing on the factors that shape domestic responses to foreign organised crime-related designations. As the use of organised crime-related sanctions expands, they are increasingly applied between otherwise allied states, complicating assumptions about cooperation and shared norms. The research investigates how perceptions of legitimacy, evidentiary standards, legal safeguards, domestic political elite involvement in organised crime, and broader geopolitical relationships influence host-state willingness to cooperate with or resist sanctions. It further considers whether and how host-state political will is factored into designation processes, and the degree of alignment required between sending and receiving states for sanctions to produce meaningful effects. Drawing on analysis of a range of open source data and interviews with officials, academics, private-sector actors, and leading sanctions dossier submitters, the paper advances a framework for understanding political will as a central determinant of sanctions outcomes in the organised domain. It aims to outline implications for the more politically feasible and effective use of sanctions against organised crime, positioning sanctions as a potentially underutilised but strategically significant policy tool when political dynamics are adequately accounted for.