Criminality and New Cycle of Violence: Evidence from Colombia

The 2016 Peace Agreement between the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) marked a historic milestone. First, the largest insurgent group and the greatest challenge to state territorial control demobilized. Second, large parts of the country experienced a degree of peace not seen for decades. Yet, shortly after demobilisation, several regions descended once again into a violent spiral (2017–2021), driven by attempts by other armed and criminal organisations to expand territorial control, the emergence of dissident factions of the former guerrilla, and the presence of criminal ecosystems and local armed actors seeking to regulate communities and spaces beyond the reach of the state. These dynamics gave rise to a new cycle of violence. Unlike previous cycles, this new phase is not primarily characterised by insurgent or counter-revolutionary agendas. Rather, it exhibits a distinctly criminal face: armed and criminal groups pursue territorial control in order to extract resources and govern localities, rather than to challenge the state or advance alternative models of regional development. In response, the government of Gustavo Petro launched the policy of Total Peace, an ambitious initiative aimed at ending armed violence by promoting simultaneous negotiations with “political” armed organisations and dialogues and rapprochements with high-impact criminal actors. The policy represented a positive turning point in three respects: it recognised the interconnections between armed organisations and criminal networks, the linkages between rural and urban forms of violence, and the centrality of safeguarding and humanitarian relief within peacebuilding efforts. However, the implementation of negotiations and rapprochements with armed and criminal organisations has been marked by the absence of clear methodologies, frameworks, and red lines. While violence between the state and armed actors has decreased, Total Peace has not succeeded in de-escalating violent confrontations between armed groups themselves, including actors currently engaged in peace talks, and has generated new humanitarian impacts. Progress has also been uneven, and in several territories these groups have strengthened their local governance capacities. Through three case studies (Tumaco, Arauca y Buenaventura) featuring distinct criminal actors (Farc dissidents, ELN and Shottas and Spartans), this paper argues that the lack of a clear diagnosis regarding the nature of criminal organisations, the emerging ontology of violence, and the importance of timing and sequencing in negotiation processes has significant implications for how agreements between the state and criminal organisations can be conceived. It demonstrates that the ‘real politics’ of organised crime matters and seeks to contribute to the growing literature on political settlements and to ongoing debates on how to design more politically feasible strategies for countering organised crime globally.