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Politicisation of Competition Agencies: In Search of an Analytical Framework Fit for Trump Era

Democracy
Governance
Institutions
Populism
Regulation
Rule of Law
Maciej Bernatt
University of Warsaw
Maciej Bernatt
University of Warsaw

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Abstract

This paper proposes an analytical framework to examine the politicisation of competition agencies. It aims to clarify how to distinguish between forms of politicisation that can be perceived as neutral and those that pose systemic risks to these agencies. The paper explains that such risks arise when politicisation involves the implementation of illiberal politics—that is, politics that reject key tenets of constitutional democracy and entail the arbitrary use of state economic powers—thereby undermining the rule-of-law-based character of competition law enforcement. The description of patterns of this impermissible politicisation (referred to as the ‘illiberal blueprint’) is intended to help identify when red lines have been crossed. The illiberal blueprint includes, among other features, interference in the competition agency’s decision-making processes, erosion of its independence, attrition of senior staff, restrictions on the scope of the agency’s powers, politically motivated enforcement, self-restraint in cases involving politically connected firms, as well as political pressure on courts and judges. The paper draws on past lessons from Hungary and Poland and compares them with recent developments in the US since January 2025, particularly those involving the Federal Trade Commission. It tentatively finds that the patterns emerging in the US today are not unique but align with those observed in other countries experiencing democratic backsliding and rule of law crisis. Finally, the paper examines potential responses, discussing institutional and procedural improvements within competition agencies that could bolster their resilience. It also envisages an informal response from the public and the antitrust community.