EEC Enlargement, German Reunification and Security Dilemma in Europe, 1961-1986

This paper addresses a problem of applicability of the neorealist theory to foreign policy analysis. From a neorealist perspective, an international structure determines outcomes and the behavior of states. Yet it treats only peripherally the process by which anarchy and distribution of power in the international system are transmitted onto the states behavior. This paper argues that introducing concept of security explicitly into the neorealist theory clarifies the causal links between structure and outcome and permits a more detailed analysis of the states foreign behavior than it could be possible from only structural perspective. With a focus on Europe, this paper develops and tests several hypotheses linking severity of security pressure, capability changes, and Germany’s policy towards the EEC enlargement in a period from 1961 to 1986. Judging from a database of national capabilities and existing archival documents on European Security, German Reunification and EEC Enlargement, national efforts to achieve greater security turn out to be a function of power and the opportunity which nations possess of reducing danger by their own efforts and alliances they make with others. The logic of the neorealist theoretical argument does have certain implications for where a security dilemma proves crucial to international actors. Being self-bounded in the EEC with an enlarging number of participants the Federal Republic signaled its benign intents to smaller states, and eased the tension in Europe to enable peaceful reunification of German eastern territories.