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Transnational Illiberalism: Kin-State Politics to Challenge European Democracy

Europe (Central and Eastern)
Democracy
Foreign Policy
International Relations
Nationalism
Populism
Representation
Political Regime
Ágnes Erőss
Free University of Bozen-Bolzano
Ágnes Erőss
Free University of Bozen-Bolzano
Robert Sata
Central European University

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Abstract

Viktor Orbán’s illiberal democracy profoundly affects not only domestic politics but transnational relations with Hungary’s ethnic kin in neighboring countries. Democratic backsliding and curbed political competition at home allow Orbán to use kin-state politics to cement his authoritarian rule among Hungarians, both within and outside of Hungary thus challenging the ideal of European democracy. Examining the developments of Hungarian kin-state politics, we argue that post-2010 kin-state policies serve primarily the interests of the increasingly authoritarian state, in which political authority centers on a single patron controlling an elaborate system of rewards and punishments. This way, illiberalism is ‘exported’ via kin state policies: homeland support is conditional on loyalty – disabling political competitors, promoting illiberal agenda, and limiting external citizenship to gratitude votes. Local patronage networks are replaced with a trans-border network, topped by Orbán himself. Political and material intervention for the kin-abroad by the Hungarian state becomes a reward mechanism available only via loyal connections for supporters of Orbán’s regime, transforming external kin into valuable assets for domestic and international policy objectives. As a results, political competition within the minority community is canceled out, selected minority parties often receiving more financial support from Hungary than their home states. Similarly, the extension of kin-state citizenship and external voting rights are meant as pay-back avenues for minority members, to receive gratitude votes in exchange for the support received. In addition, Fidesz gained control of minority media outlets aims at political closure and suppressed dissent within minority communities. Agenda setting is disabled, Hungary-funded regional newspapers and media outlets spread Fidesz propaganda and fake news instead, often criticizing the host-state government and aiming at creating an ethnic parallelism in which Hungarian minority communities live their life as if they were part of Hungary. This way, Hungarians minorities become isolated not only from the political opposition in Budapest but also their host democracies, becoming part of the illiberal regime, readily supporting Orbán, perceived as the protector of national interest even if Hungary’s “peacock dance” between the EU and Russia risks Hungarian minorities not only in Ukraine, already facing securitization, but also Romania and Serbia, where despite strong anti-Hungarian stances, Orbán endorsed similar-minded leaders and candidates to build his trans-European illiberal alliance.