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Too Many Actors, Too Little Action? Institutional Multiplicity in the EU Institutions’ Anti-Corruption System

Democracy
Corruption
Big Data
Fernanda Odilla
Università di Bologna
Fernanda Odilla
Università di Bologna

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Abstract

This exploratory mixed-method study assesses the strengths and limitations of the EU’s multi-agency system for combating fraud and corruption within EU institutions. It draws primarily on semi-structured interviews and informal conversations with experts in political corruption, as well as with staff from EU-level anti-fraud and anti-corruption bodies. In addition, the study relies on a systematic analysis—using AI-based techniques—of all news items and press releases published on the official websites of the relevant agencies up to December 2025. The research aims to understand how the EU’s accountability strategy operates in practice, with particular attention to whether, and how, anti-corruption efforts are prioritized within the broader EU “web of accountability”. Methodologically, it combines qualitative thematic analysis of interview data with computational approaches. The latter include AI-based unsupervised machine learning techniques applied to document titles, subtitles, and full texts published by the agencies under examination. Preliminary findings point to a clear prioritization of fraud, particularly fraud involving EU funds and VAT, within the EU accountability network, while direct anti-corruption efforts remain limited. As several interviewees emphasized, although corruption formally falls within the mandates of multiple bodies, it is rarely treated as a primary operational focus. The institutional multiplicity that characterizes the EU accountability landscape, where oversight and investigative responsibilities are dispersed, while punitive powers are concentrated in a small number of actors (EPPO and more recently the Anti-Money Laundering Authority), creates both opportunities and challenges. While overlapping mandates can enhance coverage and foster complementarity, they may also generate duplication, competition, and coordination problems, especially given divergent norms, mandates, and procedures. As a consequence of this institutional configuration, grey areas of corruption and undue influence receive limited attention, with major scandals, such as Qatargate and Huawei, often investigated primarily by national authorities rather than EU-level bodies.