Analysing the Regulatory Network from the Perspective of Regulator Independence (Case Study: The Communications Regulatory Authority of Iran)

Regulatory independence has been widely discussed in the literature, yet most studies focus on its formal, legal dimensions and overlook how regulators’ actual autonomy may vary across the diverse sectors they oversee. This article examines the de facto independence of Iran’s Communications Regulatory Authority (CRA) across three regulatory domains—telecommunications, radio spectrum management, and postal services. Although the CRA operates under a uniform statutory framework, its effective independence differs across these domains due to variation in actor composition, institutional arrangements, and the distribution of influence among key stakeholders. Adopting a relational–institutional perspective, the study conceptualizes de facto independence as shaped by the regulator’s embeddedness in networks of policymakers, parallel regulatory bodies, and regulated firms, as well as by the relative power and influence these actors exert over one another. Using Social Network Analysis (SNA), the research maps inter-organizational interactions and influence ties in each domain to explore how differences in actor density, task allocation, power asymmetries, and patterns of mutual influence relate to variations in the CRA’s practical autonomy. The comparative analysis reveals meaningful cross-domain variation in de facto independence despite identical legal mandates. These differences appear associated with sector-specific constellations of actors, differing levels of institutional overlap, and asymmetries in the capacity of actors to influence regulatory outcomes. The study contributes to regulatory governance scholarship by emphasizing the relational foundations of de facto independence and by demonstrating how multi-domain regulators in hybrid political systems operate under varying configurations of power and interdependence.