Corruption and Electoral Accountability: Voting Behavior and Electoral Outcomes

In recent decades, the harmful effects of corruption on a society have been empirically established and are now considered indisputable. Corruption is associated with less economic development, greater inequality, poorer health outcomes and environmental conditions, less generalized trust and less happy populations (Mauro 1995; Holmberg and Rothstein 2011; Welsch 2004; Gupta et al. 2002). According to democratic theory, one key mechanism through which citizens can combat corrupt elite behavior is electoral choice. Given that corruption is pervasive among incumbents or that a corruption scandal breaks prior to an election, rational voters who understand the costs of corruption will turn against the government in favor of a cleaner challenger and “throw the rascals out”. Given its dire consequences, the fact that European citizens have a strong distaste for such practices and that involvement in corrupt dealings is usually a criminal act, it is still puzzling that politicians and parties that have been involved in corruption scandals to a surprisingly large extent only suffer minor losses and often manage to get re-elected (see for example Peters & Welch 1980; Reed 1999; Chang & Golden 2010; Eggers & Fisher 2011; Bågenholm 2013; de Sousa & Moriconi 2013; Basinger 2013; Praino et al. 2013; Crisp et al. 2014). Even though several studies find that the electorate actually punishes politicians and/or parties involved in corrupt dealings (Clark 2009), there are still many exceptions to this rule and many voters still remain loyal to their preferred parties and it is thus it is still highly relevant to ask why and under what circumstances voters support corrupt politicians or attempt to hold them accountable by voting them out of office. Despite an increasing literature in this field, the puzzle of why voters are willing to vote for public officials that they know to be corrupt is still not satisfactorily resolved. In this Section we propose four Panels, with different methodological approaches: Panel 1: The effect of corruption on voting behavior: Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs What mechanism(s) lead an individual to choose to vote for a party or politician that he or she knows to be corrupt? Recent empirical research has shown that the presence of electoral choice is far from a panacea in curbing corruption, suggesting a breakdown in a key mechanism of democratic accountability. In this Panel, we encourage scholars to propose manuscripts that study the effects of corruption on voting behavior via experimental or quasi-experimental research designs. Participants are welcome to conceive of the concept of corruption in a broad (societal) or narrow (individual scandals) manor to test these effects. Panel 2: The effect of corruption on voting behavior: Comparative Designs In this Panel, we encourage scholars to propose manuscripts that study the effects of corruption on voting behavior via comparative research designs. Testing whether certain mechanisms hold in varying contexts is crucial of our understanding of this issue, and comparisons at all levels (country, regions, municipalities, cities, etc.) are welcome. Participants are welcome to conceive of the concept of corruption in a broad (societal) or narrow (individual scandals) manor to test these effects. Panel 3: Various forms of corruption, voting behavior and electoral outcomes In this Panel, we encourage participants to come up with ways to test how different forms of corruption (bribes, patronage, political scandals, etc.) affect voting behavior of citizens and/or electoral outcomes. Moreover, papers that come up with ways to test varying levels of the severity of the corruption involved in the study are also welcome. Panel 4: Corruption’s effect on electoral behavior: The effects of micro and macro factors This Panel encourages participants to use multi-level designs to test mechanisms at the micro and macro level that explain a voter’s response to corruption and/or outcomes in elections. For example, how do individual level factors/attitudes/perceptions interact with structural level factors such as electoral institutions, party systems, access to information, inequality, etc. in determining whether an individual abstains from voting in the face of corruption, votes for an alternative or continues to support his or her preferred party? References Bågenholm, A. (2013). Throwing the rascals out? The electoral effects of corruption allegations and corruption scandals in Europe 1981–2011. Crime, Law and Social Change, 60(5), 595-609. Basinger, S. J. (2013). Scandals and congressional elections in the post-Watergate era. Political Research Quarterly, 66(2), 385-398. Chang, E., Golden, M. & Hill, S. J. (2010) Legislative malfeasance and political accountability. World Politics 62 (2) 177-220 . Clark, M. (2009). Valence and electoral outcomes in Western Europe, 1976–1998. Electoral Studies, 28(1), 111-122. Crisp, B. F., Olivella, S., Potter, J. D., & Mishler, W. (2014). Elections as instruments for punishing bad representatives and selecting good ones. Electoral Studies, 34, 1-15. de Sousa, L. & Moriconi, M. (2013) Why voters do not throw the rascals out? – A conceptual framework for analyzing electoral punishment of corruption. Crime, Law and Social Change 60: 471-502. Eggers, A., & Fisher, A. C. (2011). Electoral Accountability and the UK Parliamentary Expenses Scandal: Did Voters Punish Corrupt MPs?. Available at SSRN 1931868. Gupta, S., Davoodi, H., & Alonso-Terme, R. (2002). Does corruption affect income inequality and poverty? Economics of Governance, 3(1), 23-45. Holmberg, S., & Rothstein, B. (2011). Dying of corruption. Health Economics, Policy and Law, 6(04), 529-547. Mauro, P. (1995). Corruption and growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 681-712. Peters, J. G., & Welch, S. (1980). The effects of charges of corruption on voting behavior in congressional elections. The American Political Science Review, 697-708. Praino, R., Stockemer, D., & Moscardelli, V. G. (2013). The lingering effect of scandals in Congressional elections: incumbents, challengers, and voters. Social Science Quarterly, 94(4), 1045-1061. Reed, S. R. (1999). Strategic voting in the 1996 Japanese general election. Comparative Political Studies, 32(2), 257-270. Welsch, H. (2004). Corruption, growth, and the environment: a cross-country analysis. Environment and Development Economics, 9(05), 663-693.