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Democracy has come under pressure worldwide. Accordingly, recent literature focuses not only on the new democracies in non-Western regions, but also on the long-established democracies in Europe and North America. Relevant lines of research include the study of ‘militant democracy’ (e.g., Müller 2016), democratic backsliding and resilience (e.g., Merkel and Lührmann 2021; Riedl et al. 2024) and the reactions of mainstream democrats to authoritarian/populist challenger parties (e.g., Heinze 2018). While mainstream research on democratic resilience has focused on various institutional safeguards against autocratization, the role of federal arrangements has rarely been addressed. This is all the more remarkable as federalism has been seen as a constitutional bulwark of democracy in the Madisonian tradition. It is no coincidence that in some new democracies, such as in West Germany or Austria after 1945, a federal order was (re)established as a protection against autocratic centralization of power. However, empirical studies have shown that the effects of federalism on democracy are sometimes ambivalent, as it can allow the creation of authoritarian enclaves at the subnational level (Benton 2012; Gibson 2013; Grumbach 2023), provide incentives for opportunistic/populist strategies (Bednar 2009; Souris et al. 2023), or increase the negative effects of political polarization on democratic governance (Bednar 2021). A recent study thus examines the ‘conditions under which federalism is likely to protect democracy’ (Kaufman et al. 2024, 16), but only for selected federations in the Global South and the US, not for other established democracies. Given that populist and extremist parties are on the rise even in ‘relatively healthy’ democracies such as Germany (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2023, 197), it is more important than ever to gain in-depth insights into whether a given federal order would effectively protect or endanger democratic governance, for example if antidemocratic parties were to enter some state governments (Grotz and Kropp 2024) and/or the federal government. Against this background, the panel aims to analyze the impact of federal and multi-level arrangements on democratic resilience in established democracies. It bridges the gap between comparative federalism and related fields of democracy studies. The papers take different perspectives. They address the question of whether and how different federal polities (e.g. administrative vs. dualist federations; centralised vs. decentralised federal settings; formerly unitary settings that underwent federalization) provide opportunities for the strengthening of radical/populist parties or even authoritarian takeovers. The panel also addresses the question how federal governments (and/or democratic subnational governments) cope with autocratization in constituent units or, conversely, how constituent units governed by democratic actors respond to autocratization at the federal level. Moreover, the panel discusses specific institutional features that facilitate or protect against authoritarian takeovers: Do federal and federalizing arrangements enhance or limit the growth of radical political forces? What entry points into government do federal institutions provide for these actors? What is the role of institutionalized and/or informal national-subnational linkages, such as intergovernmental councils and administrative networks, in this context? Finally, how can federal arrangements be made more resilient in order to protect democracy more effectively, and which actor strategies function as sources of democratic resilience in multi-level polities?
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Counter-Majoritarian Institutions and Democratic Backsliding in Comparative Perspective | View Paper Details |
Towards a Disjointed-Decision Trap? Lessons from a Fragmented US-Federal Democracy | View Paper Details |
The Ambivalent Effects of Germany’s Cooperative Federalism on Democratic Resilience | View Paper Details |
Between Controlling and Blocking: Federal Democracy at Work in Belgium | View Paper Details |
Secessionist Movements, Democratization Processes and Power Dynamics | View Paper Details |