Counter-Majoritarian Institutions and Democratic Backsliding in Comparative Perspective

Scholars increasingly debate whether counter-majoritarian institutions—rules beyond the reach of popular majorities—safeguard or erode democracy. Prior research often focuses narrowly on specific institutions like federalism or lacks comparative breadth. This article broadens the scope by asking whether, and under what conditions, the entire bundle of counter-majoritarian institutions can threaten democracy. Theoretically, we argue that the type of counter-majoritarian institutions—not their quantity—determines risks, with only those lacking institutional layering proving harmful. Empirically, we combine a quantitative analysis of 98 countries with a unique comparison of the US and Switzerland—“sister republics” with similar counter-majoritarian design but divergent democratic outcomes. We find no significant relationship between the degree of counter-majoritarianism and democratic backsliding overall. Furthermore, we show that only competitive counter-majoritarianism poses a threat to democracy, and only when it is not efficiently constrained by institutional layering. Our findings underscore the overlooked protective role of political institutions and offer practical strategies to mitigate risks of democratic backsliding in contexts where constitutional reform is not feasible.