Taking Advantage of Representation and Macroeconomic Policy for Electoral Purposes: Lessons from the Case of Japan

Abstract

This panel is designed to shed new light on the electoral strategies of political elites. The literature on electoral strategies and behavior of parties and politicians show that they seek to gain votes and maintain office by serving constituency interests (e.g, Mayhew 1974; Fenno 1973; Müller and Strøm 1999). However, political elites appear to use more sophisticated and wide-ranging electoral strategies. For example, parties sometimes manipulate voter representation by strategically creating overrepresented and underrepresented constituents to get their supporters represented more than others. Furthermore, political elites may administer welfare and macroeconomic policies in different ways from one region to another. This panel aims to examine how political elites use electoral and legislative strategies for their electoral success, focusing on the case of Japan. Our panel reveals that parties and politicians have a tendency to create favorable electoral conditions to maintain their power. This panel is consisted of four papers: First, Etsuhiro Nakamura explores the representation of women in Japanese politics. Japan is a country with a lower level of women representation. Using new experimental methods, he investigates what encourages and discourages the representation of women. Second, Naofumi Fujimura looks at the malapportionment and political participation. The level of malapportionment is high in Japanese elections since ruling parties allocate a higher seat share to their support bases. He estimates the impact of the malapportionment on voter turnout and the survival of ruling parties. Third, Naoki Shimizu examines how local government finance is used as a tool for ruling parties to improve electoral outcomes. By doing so, he attempts to extend the political business cycle theory – usually applied at the national level – to the local level. Finally, Hideki Kido analyzes the impact of the so-called “welfare magnet” effects on local welfare policy. As Paul Peterson points out, local governments tend to reduce distributive expenditure because it attracts less wealthy people. He examines how this influences local governments’ decisions regarding welfare policy. Hironori Sasada and Jun’ichi Hirano will serve as discussants. Sasada is a specialist on political economy in East Asia, and Hirano is a specialist on local politics and quantitative research. Both will offer insightful comments on the four papers.