The Evolution of the Constructive Vote of No-Confidence and its Political Consequences

There are now a handful of parliamentary democracies that use the constructive vote of no-confidence, although they are still a small minority. This interesting mechanism has had little conceptual or empirical research devoted to it. The scholarly literature does not have clear answers to questions such as: Does this type of no-confidence truly belong to positive parliamentarism, as most assume, or can it also be categorized as negative parliamentarism? Does this type of no-confidence reduce the number of governments terminated by a no-confidence vote and increase government durability? How does it influence the operation of the government during its tenure in office? This paper traces the historical origins of the constructive vote of no-confidence; delineate its development and expansion; develops the conceptual distinction between positive and negative parliamentarism through a discussion of this mechanism; and then studies its impact on and consequences for the way parliaments and governments operate. This paper conducts a three-level comparison. First, it looks at countries that adopted a constructive vote of no-confidence from the beginning, asking if they share certain characteristics or had similar goals. It then compares the group of countries that adopted this mechanism to a similar-sized group of parliamentary democracies that have a regular vote of no-confidence, assessing the frequency, dynamics and success of no-confidence motions. It then pays special attention to two case studies where the constructive vote of no-confidence was not adopted from the outset but was a relatively recent political reform – Belgium and Israel. In short, this paper’s goal is in line with that of the workshop, to examine the origins and consequences of a mechanism of positive and negative parliamentarism. Its contributions will be historical, conceptual, and analytically comparative in nature. Moreover, this paper could have policy-relevant implications for ongoing discussions of parliamentary reform.