Is Negative Parliamentarism Sometimes No Parliamentarism After All? Evidence on Tiered systems of Power Separation from the Weimar Republic, 1920‒1933

Parliamentarism, Semi-Presidentialism and Presidentialism are often seen as distinct options for setting up the separation of powers. Either option privileges a single body in terms of cabinet investiture. Some political systems however feature mechanisms that do not monopolize control over cabinet composition to either parliament or president. They rather give precedence in determining cabinet composition to one, “first-tiered”, body, but empower the other one to step in if the first-tiered body fails to act. Such was the case with the German “Weimar Constitution”. Parliament with its right to discharge the cabinet served as the first tier. Germany could thus be classified as a system of Negative Parliamentarism. But as long as parliament did not act the president could determine cabinet composition on his own. Germany could thus also be seen as a Presidential system. Only Semi-presidentialism would never seem to fit due to both parliament and president being capable of determining cabinet composition. Similarly, parliament could legislate on its own. However, the president could issue decrees that, if not overturned by a parliament, became law. Consequently, control over both cabinet composition and legislation was held by either parliament or president, but conditional on either of them acting. We address this issue of “Tiered systems” of power separation conceiving of them as enduring processes of equilibrium selection among parliamentary elites and the president. Patterns of behavior would thus either succumb to expectations as implied under Negative Parliamentarism or under Presidentialism at any point in time. But there would not be one single pattern. We employ novel data on positions of major parliamentary parties, as well as on legislative activities of factions, cabinets and presidents in Germany for the period 1920-1933. We hope to complement the recent debates on systems of power separation, notably under Negative Parliamentarism, with this equilibrium-based perspective.