It is assumed that democratisation will be supported by the majority of the population. There may be differences of opinion, even conflict, over the institutions that are created to introduce and establish democratic practice. Also, the regimes which are constructed in developing countries through democratisation may still retain authoritarian elements and will not satisfy the requirements of liberal democracy. This does not, however, necessarily negate their claims to legitimacy as liberal democracy does not have a monopoly on regime legitimacy. Bhutan's recent experience of democratisation has thrown up a set of unusual legitimation challenges while still reflecting some of the legitimation issues found in newly democratising states. The most unusual aspect of Bhutan's democratisation experience is that it was introduced from above by the authoritarian ruler - democracy by decree. There was no popular discontent or bottom-up agitation, no scheming elites, no foreign interference and no economic crisis. All the normal causes of democratisation were absent. Furthermore the population of Bhutan were not enthusiastic about the introduction of democracy. They were reluctant democratisers. Their acceptance of democracy paradoxically was derived from the strong legitimacy of the institution of monarchy as the central pillar of the Bhutanese state. The legitimacy of democracy comes from its association with the wishes of the monarchy and the strength of the bureaucracy supporting the monarchy. But, after 5 years of democratisation, have the newly-introduced institutions of democracy established independent legitimacy or are citizens simply still acceding to the monarchy's wishes and provide consent? Does legitimacy arise from popular expectations of what government does or should do rather than through ideas of popular participation? This paper traces the history of democratisation in Bhutan within a framework of legitimacy and consent, examining the institutions established to facilitate democratisation.
