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Party Government and Ministerial De-selection in Parliamentary Systems

Comparative Politics
Elites
European Politics
Executives
Government
Political Leadership
Political Parties
Institutions
Cristina Bucur
University College Dublin
Cristina Bucur
University College Dublin

Abstract

Cabinet ministers have often been described as serving multiple principals in the government and party hierarchy in parliamentary systems where government coalitions are the norm. However, single principal-agent models are still the industry standard in studies of ministerial durability. Using data from France, Portugal and Romania, this paper adopts a multiple-principal model to capture variation in ministerial accountability to presidents, prime ministers and party principals. To determine which principal-agent relationships are associated with shorter and longer ministerial tenures, a unique dataset on the tenures of French, Portuguese and Romanian ministers during two legislative terms was compiled. Using data on personal characteristics and events experienced by ministers during their time in office, we find that the principals’ ability to control cabinet composition and the impact of resignation calls on the ministers’ hazard rate varies across periods of unified and divided government. Additionally, ministers are more likely to be held accountable by presidents and prime ministers who combine this position with that of party leaders than by the party outside public office. These findings highlight the impact of intra-party politics on the operation of parliamentary and semi-presidential cabinets and emphasise the extra-constitutional factors accounting for the variation in political practices across and within similar institutional frameworks over time. Additionally, our findings speak to the debate regarding the evolution of party government in modern parliamentary democracies. In addition to their role in political appointments, the political parties’ ability to contain agency loss and fire their representatives in central government is a good complementary test for the extent of their control over the executive. In this context, our results indicate that the conditions for party government in parliamentary democracies are challenged by the shift that has taken place in intra-party and intra-executive power to the benefit of party leaders and chief executives.