Legitimacy as a Social Contract and Russian Politics

This paper develops a social contract theory of legitimacy. It draws on ideas developed by Russian scholars, such as Aleksei Makarkin (2011), and relates them to general debates about legitimacy. It explores the strengths and weaknesses of conceptualising legitimacy as an implicit social contract and methodological challenges and implications of this approach for empirical work. The paper uses post-Soviet Russia to explore whether this perspective can be used to understand the relationship between institutional reform and regime legitimacy in practice. Authorities in any political regime use various legitimation strategies, but they do not necessarily ensure legitimacy or citizens' agreement that the regime has the right to rule and the authority to demand compliance (Lipset 1959). Many authoritarian regimes use coercive measures and instrumental incentives to ensure acquiescence. However, if legitimacy refers to citizens' belief in the appropriateness of the authorities, any kind of regime could in principle be called legitimate. However, one condition would have to be fulfilled: beyond instrumental motivations and fear of coercion, there has to be another basis for acquiescence linked to some sort of communal goals of society. In recent debates among Russian authors (Makarkin 2011) regime legitimacy is related to a social contract. This is an interesting idea that warrants further investigation. It is reminiscent of eudemonic legitimation of communist regimes based on the promise of material well-being (Holmes 1993). This paper also analyses key reforms of the Russian political system since 2000 to see if and how they relate to the idea of a social contract and if these institutional reforms had consequences for legitimacy. One way of assessing this is to measure the discrepancy between what citizens view as the main purpose of a certain institution and how well this purpose is satisfied (Muller 1970; Fraser 1974).