NATO in Libya - (un)Learned lessons from Kosovo

The experiences in Kosovo were one of the key elements shaping the Euro-Atlantic security system in the post Cold War era and the lessons learned became the focal point of security discourse after the Balkan wars. Since vital similarities between operations in Kosovo (Operation Allied Force) and Libya (Operation Odyssey Dawn) are clearly remarkable and significant on structural, strategic and operational levels, authors consider it reasonable to analyze and compare the actions undertaken and not undertaken by NATO in terms of lessons drawn from 1999 Balkan experience. Being aware of the contextual and strategic change within the Alliance and in its external environment, authors ask the question which experiences from Kosovo have been used for designing and conducting the operation in Libya and which have been not. Moreover, as the initial research showed several differences may be observed when the lessons present in the official discourse and when the analysis of the reality are considered and compared. The paper investigates also the context and potential goals of these divergences. The aim of the paper is first to answer the question whether NATO is a learning organization and draws lessons from past experiences and, as a result to show what lessons have been learned, what mistakes have been repeated and what factors interrupted the learning process; second to answer the question whether the contextual and strategic changes allow NATO to use its past experiences for acting in the future; and third to indicate recommendations for future actions.