Foreign Policy Reasoning and Securitisation in Arctic Affairs: Bringing Critical Geopolitics back in

Since the Arctic is undergoing fundamental transformative change in recent years, it finds itself ‘at the center of world politics’ (Heininen and Southcott 2010) thereby attracting new profound interests by Arctic and non-Arctic states. With the Arctic ice cover receding, shortened global maritime trade routes, vast amounts of hydrocarbons, minerals, fresh water and fish stocks may become accessible. Although there is (yet) no indication that the ‘race to the pole’ will lead to serious tensions, let alone military conflict, particularly the littoral states have stressed exclusive sovereignty over national territories likely to affect the structure and effectiveness of regional governance initiatives that have shaped Arctic cooperation since the end of the Cold War. Essentially, the securitisation of interwoven issue-areas such as environmental degradation, ocean management, maritime transport, energy production and not least the human security dimension of local indigenous peoples have provoked national responses to common governance challenges and a ‘use it or lose it’-mentality among Arctic states (Harper 2007). In contrast to such neoclassical interpretations of Arctic governance, the paper suggests a more in-depth reflection of foreign policy reasoning among Arctic stakeholders. Drawing on the critical school of geopolitics (Agnew and Corbridge 1995; Ó Tuathail 1996; Dodds 2010), Arctic spatial ‘writings’ and ‘representations’ in national foreign policy strategies will be identified, compared and evaluated. Findings will indicate that there is not much to worry about for future cooperation and the peaceful management of common goods among at least the Arctic Five (Denmark, Norway, Canada, Russia and the US), while claims and preferences articulated by non-Arctic actors such as China, South Korea and the EU base on different narratives and may thus cause new friction.