Bargaining Strategies in WTO Negotiations

Members of International Organisations (IOs) may select among different negotiation strategies for which several classifications have been created, inter alia soft vs. hard negotiation strategies (involving, e.g., mutual exchange of concessions vs. threats) (Hopmann 1996). Diverse factors may influence the choice of these strategies by different IO members, e.g. a country’s power, based on its economic strength. There is evidence from EU negotiations that more powerful states are likely to use hard strategies (Dür and Matteo 2009). Less powerful countries, in contrast, may rather refrain from doing so as such behaviour would not appear credible (Pruitt 1983). In addition to these factors, this paper is the first to examine whether experience in an IO affects member behaviour in negotiations, i.e. whether newcomers choose different negotiation strategies than long-standing members. Rational choice theory and sociological theories make different predictions on newcomer behaviour. Finally, there are further measures parties may apply to boost their clout in negotiations, e.g. they can use internal power sources such as negotiation skills or they can increase their negotiating delegation. This study is the first which systematically investigates the reasons for and the use of particular negotiation strategies in the current WTO negotiations, using quantitative indicators. For this purpose, a novel dataset has been compiled, based on 40 semi-structured expert interviews with WTO diplomats, on the use of negotiation strategies by different delegations in the Doha Round negotiations. These data are used to identify which factors are crucial in selecting a specific bargaining strategy in WTO negotiations. Dür, A. and G. Matteo, 2009: “Power and Bargaining Tactics”, Journal of Common Market Studies 48(3): 557-78. Hopmann, P. T., 1996: The negotiation process and the resolution of international conflicts. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. Pruitt, D. G., 1983: “Strategic Choice in Negotiation”, American Behavioral Scientist 27(2): 167-94.