Comparing Democratizing Functions of Deliberation in Parliaments

In my paper, I develop a theoretical framework for the analysis of parliamentary deliberation in order to compare its potential democratizing functions across diverse political systems. Deliberation in parliaments fulfills diverse functions in democratic systems. However, how deliberation works and what democratic functions it can fulfill depends on its specific institutionalization within the parliament and on the position of the parliament within the political system. More concretely, the strength of the role of factions and their political coherence, as they differ between presidential and parliamentary systems, has a great impact on the quality and on the effects of parliamentary deliberation. My paper proceeds in three steps. First, I propose that the forms and effects of parliamentary deliberation can be fruitfully analyzed and explained by the (im)balance of two conflicting logics. The strength and coherence of factions nurture a (legitimate) positional logic and the procedures of the parliament foster a discursive logic. Different tensions between both logics in different systemic settings produce diverse outcomes. Second, I argue that the resulting differing effects can partly be interpreted as democratizing functions. For a conceptualization of the functions, I propose to locate them on a continuum between the poles of an integrating and a politicizing function. In the third step, I apply my theoretical framework to a comparative analysis of democratizing functions of three parliaments that differ in their degree of factional strength and coherence: The German Bundestag with its clear cut majorities and high factional coherence (parliamentary system type), the House of Representatives of the American Congress (no strictly clear majorities, but rather high factional coherence, presidential system type), and the European Parliament with no clear factional majorities and with high factional incoherence due to its transnational character.